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CRITICAL LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING
VOUCHERS
STEVEN GREEN'

The practice of using school vouchers for private religious
schools has reached a critical threshold as both a legal and policy
issue. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program enacted in
1990, initially for nonsectarian schools, was expanded in 1995 to
religious schools.1 Although the 1995 amendments expanded
student participation ten-fold,2 the program remains severely
under enrolled due to the lack of start-up schools. These schools
failed to materialize as voucher proponents had promised. The
Milwaukee program has been critically studied, and with its
success measured by student performance, is inconclusive.
Educational scholars disagreed on testing methods and
finds. An increase in parental satisfaction was the only result on
which all sides agreed. Public voucher programs were also
established in Cleveland, Ohio in 19963 and in Florida in 1999,
the latter's scope being statewide. 4 Similar to the Milwaukee
plan, these programs all involve religious schools and currently
limit eligibility to low income children and children attending
failing schools.5
As in Milwaukee, however, both programs have yet to take
off. Student performance gains are equivocal and the expected
influx of market-created schools has not materialized. Many
scholars and analysts also question whether the voucher
programs have provided any real benefit for public schools or the
remaining public school students.
t J.D., University of Texas; Ph.D., MA., University of North Carolina; B.A.
Texas Christian University. General Counsel and Director of Policy for Americans
United for Separation of Church and State.
1 See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607-08 (Wis. 1998).
2 See id.
3 See MICHAEL MINTROM, POLICY ENTREPRENEURS AND SCHOOL CHOICE 24

(Georgetown University Press) (2000).
4 See id. at 34n.11.
5 See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 2000); see also
Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608.
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If the expected votes in the voucher referenda in California
and Michigan are any indication, public patience with vouchers,
as the miracle cure for the ills of public education, may be
waning. 6 The time has come for voucher programs to prove
themselves.
Voucher programs present a critical legal issue. Since 1992,
vouchers or voucher-like programs have been challenged eleven
times, with courts upholding vouchers for religious schooling in
three instances, but striking such schemes in the remaining
eight.7 This split-in-court holding has yet to induce action from
the Supreme Court. In 1998, the high court denied certiorariin
the Milwaukee decision, which upheld vouchers.8 The Supreme
Court later denied review in three cases striking voucher
programs. 9 Of the two cases currently in litigation, the retrial in
the Sixth Circuit of the Cleveland plan 10 is the likely candidate
to go all of the way to the Supreme Court. The high court has
already intervened in the case by staying an injunction that had
halted the program."
Most observers believe action by the
Supreme Court is inevitable, though a decision in the Cleveland
plan is probably two years off. While we await a court ruling,
the policy and legal arguments continue to rage.
Proponents of school voucher programs make essentially
three arguments for voucher programs that include religious
schools. The first is that public schools are failing and in need of
6 See MINTROM, supra note 3 at 23, (stating that the "[e]fforts to introduce

voucher programs have been rigorously resisted by representatives of the education
establishment, and civil liberties groups have engaged in court battles to prevent
the use of public dollars for education at religious and other private schools").
7 See, e.g., Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 948; Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57,
66 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding voucher program did not violate the Establishment,
Equal Protection, Free Exercise, Due Process or Free Speech Clauses, and is
therefore constitutional); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't., 728 A.2d 127, 147 (Me.
1999) (holding voucher program did not violate the Free Exercise, Establishment, or
Equal Protection Clauses, and is therefore constitutional); Chittendentown Sch.
Dist. v. Vermont Dep't. of Educ., 738 A.D. 539, 563-64 (Vt. 1999) (holding voucher
program unconstitutional because it lacked appropriate restrictions); Jackson, 578
N.W.2d at 632 (upholding voucher program as constitutional).
8 See Jackson v. Benson, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).

9 See Strout v. Albanese, 528 U.S. 931 (1999); Bagley v. Raymond School Dep't,
528 U.S. 947 (1999); Andrews v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 528 U.S. 1066 (1999).
10 See Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 948 (noting that the circuit court affirmed

the district court's decision finding that the voucher program was unconstitutional).
11 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 528 U.S. 983 (Supreme Court stayed an
injunction pending "the disposition of the appeal by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit").
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reform. They point to low test scores and graduation rates
among poor and minority students and international studies
that rank American students in the middle among industrialized
nations. Such figures, however, can be misleading. While
minority achievement and graduation rates are at unacceptable
levels, the gaps between white and black students have been
narrowing. Student performance is up nationwide, more so
among minority students.
I agree that some urban and rural schools are failing.
Voucher proponents create the perception, however, that the
only solution for failing schools is a voucher to a private school
These
and that reforming public education is hopeless.
propositions ignore the significant improvements to public
education that have occurred in recent years. Results from the
National Assessment of Education Progress Test indicate that
math scores have risen every year since 1990.12 Goals 2000 has
also shown impressive results in student performance and
parental involvement nationwide. 13 Initiatives such as the
Wisconsin SAGE Program have shown that reducing class size is
the single, most effective means of improving student
performance, where African-American students narrowed the
academic achievement gap with their fellow white students. 14
In fact, students in the SAGE Program, on average,
outperform Milwaukee voucher students even though they are
drawn from the same ethnic and socioeconomic classes. 5
Conversely, many private schools do not outperform public
schools when factors such as class size, parental income
education, and parental involvement are taken into account.
12 See National Assessment of Educational Progress, The Nation's Report Card:

Mathematics 2000, Executive Summary, at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/
pubstmain2000I2001517.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
13 See People for the American Way, What's Wrong with School Voucher
(last
Proposals, at http'//www.pfaw.org/issues/education/voucher.criteria.shtml
visited Jan. 16, 2002) (discussing improvement by various states).
14 See Rethinking Schools Online, The Case for Smaller Classes (Summer 2000),
at httpJ/www.rethindngschools.org/Archives/14_04/sma1144.htm (last visisted Jan.
16, 2002)

(discussing reducing class sizes to improve academic performance of

students).
15 See J.S. Online, Class-Size Cuts to Expand to Almost 600 Students (Aug.
21, 2000), at http'/www.jsonline.comfWI082100/wi-sagesuccess082100235343.asp

(last visited Jan. 29, 2002) (stating the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee School of
Education's most recent study showed students in the SAGE performed better than
students in comparison schools on the Comprehensive Basic Skills Test given in
May 1999).
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Voucher proponents argue that increased educational
spending has not made public schools better. Spending statistics
belie the claim that public schools cannot improve. Increasing
spending to reduce class size, to fund universal prekindergarten, and to provide resources is the proven way to
improve education, not diverting funds to private schools.
Thus, where schools are failing, we have the means to
improve them through early intervention, reduced class size,
increased classroom support, and taking a zero-tolerance stance
on violence. Although we have the means, the will is often
lacking. On the other hand, vouchers can never benefit more
than a small number of children, result in the diversion of
resources and divert attention away from true school reform, and
therefore, are not the solution.
I am a lawyer, not an education analyst or social scientist.
Therefore, I want to turn the discussion to the two legal
arguments supporting vouchers, namely, that they further
notions of equality, are permissible under neutral programs, and
therefore, are generally available to religious and nonreligious
schools alike. As you may surmise, discussions of equality and
neutrality are never far removed from their policy implications,
such that the legal and policy issues tend to merge.
The first argument is that vouchers provide greater
educational opportunities for lower income children, allowing
them to exercise the same choices that middle and higher income
families enjoy. This is an attractive argument, particularly for
those among us who have worked for greater economic and social
justice. The response to this is that the compelling arguments
for greater educational equality do not necessarily lead to
providing
vouchers,
or
ensuring
greater
educational
opportunities. The flaw with the argument for educational
opportunities is not in identifying educational equality as a
principle, but in contorting it to fit voucher programs.
If greater equality is a goal, it is best achieved through a
system of safeguards and controls that ensure that all recipients
have similar access to similar products. This suggests a more
highly centralized system of decision-making, not one in which
decisions are delegated to individuals who have varying degrees
of information, sophistication and motivation.
Reliance on market forces is a poor means of achieving
greater equality. We have witnessed this in the 'economic arena
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where the disparities between the wealthy and the poor have
increased over the years. Our history and experience in the
struggle for civil rights has shown that reducing oversight and
enhancing private decision-making does not facilitate equality.
Voucher programs were once used to perpetuate racial and
Many within the civil rights
educational inequality. 16
community have grave concerns that vouchers will lead to
greater economic and racial segregation.
The equality model also assumes that voucher systems will
always be limited to lower income children, but that assumption
cannot be made. Many of the leading voucher proponents do not
come out of the same social justice tradition as the Catholic
Church and support vouchers for their libertarian, free-market
qualities and have no intent in limiting vouchers to improving
the educational situation of the poor. For example, the Institute
for Justice, a participant in all the voucher litigation, also
opposes affirmative action. Its litigation director has told me
that he sees low income vouchers as a first step to vouchers for
The California voucher
middle and upper class children.
referendum to be voted on this Tuesday will provide $4,000 for
every student, including those already enrolled in private
schools, regardless of need or income level. The Catholic Church
in California has not taken a position on that referendum
because of that very issue. Reliance on a free-market model is
an ineffective way of achieving education equality.
Any equality model must include provision for all children,
not just a few. Equality must mean equal opportunity for all.
Voucher programs will not reach more than a small number of
children, thus leaving behind the vast majority of children in the
same apparently failing schools. Again, relying on the market
model, proponents claim that vouchers will indirectly reform
those schools through increased competition. This reliance on
market models is an ineffective way of achieving equality.
Even if the market model worked, there has not been an
explanation of why equality demands an immediate response for
a small number of children but that the vast majority of children
can wait for their education opportunity to trickle down via the
16 See Molly Townes O'Brien, PrivateSchool Tuition Vouchers and the Realities

of Racial Polities, 64 TENN L. REV. 359, 374-87 (1996) (noting that the tuition
voucher movement arose in reaction to African-American efforts to gain an
education for citizenship).
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market. Voucher programs drain necessary resources from the
originating schools, take away the most motivated parents and
highest achieving children and divert attention away from true
system-wide reform.
The way to achieve true educational
equality is to institute those necessary changes that will benefit
all children, not just a few through a voucher.
The second legal argument for voucher programs is that
vouchers are permissible because they provide a neutral benefit
to children attending both religious and nonreligious schools.
Thus, they do not create incentives toward religious education as
long as the government structures a program in a manner that
neither favors nor disfavors recipients on the basis of religion
and extends any benefits on an evenhanded basis. Therefore,
the Establishment Clause is not offended when some of the
funds end up in the possession of religious entities or pay for
religiously oriented activity.
This constitutional schema, bolstered by a series of Supreme
Court decisions touting neutrality as a hallmark of religion
clauses, 17 has emerged as the legal rationale for vouchers and
was most apparent in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1998
decision upholding the constitutionality of the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program. 8
Coupled with this neutrality
argument is the assertion that any public monies that do flow to
a religious school will do so only as a result of the private choices
of the parents and children, the so-called private choice factor.
This version of neutrality, evenhanded treatment of
religious entities under generally applicable laws, has come to be
viewed as the counterpoise to the more separationist nonadvancement position in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It
is most visible in the recent holding in Mitchell v Helms,19 where
the plurality embraced neutrality as the sole operative principle
in Establishment Clause adjudication.
Justice Thomas identified government indoctrination as the
17 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997) (recognizing precedent that
upheld a neutrally available program because it did not "creat[e] [a] financial

incentive for students to undertake sectarian education") (quoting Witters v. Wash.
Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)); see also Zobrest v.

Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
18 See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 613-18, 620 (Wis. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998) (holding that the voucher program at issue was
constitutional).
19 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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evil to be avoided and asserted that "[ilf the religious, irreligious,
and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one
would conclude that any indoctrination that [occurs]... has
been done at the behest of the government." 20 Justice Thomas'
view of neutrality and constitutionality thus rests entirely on the
breadth of the class. Assuming the aid is ideologically neutral
and made generally available to religion and nonreligion alike,
then it matters not that public aid is actually used for religious
purposes. Therefore, any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot
be attributed to the government and is, thus, not of
Private choice, not government
constitutional concern.
indoctrination, occurs if neutrally available aid first passes
through the hands of numerous private citizens who are free to
direct the aid elsewhere; the government has not provided any
support of religion. For the plurality, however, while private
choice is a way of assuring neutrality, there 21is no reason why the
Establishment Clause requires such a form.
The distinction between direct and indirect aid is irrelevant,
as is the degree of independent choice so long as the aid is
neutrally given. 22 Ironically, four members of the Court have
apparently gone a step beyond vouchers even before they have
heard the first voucher case and 23 find third-party choice
unnecessary under a neutral program.
Justice Thomas's opinion commanded only a plurality, with
24
Justices O'Connor and Breyer concurring only in the result.
That concurrence must be seen as controlling, not merely in
Mitchell, but on the issue of vouchers generally. Importantly,
Justice O'Connor rejected the plurality's neutrality argument,
calling it "a rule of unprecedented breadth for the Establishment
Clause challenges to government school-aid programs. 25 Justice
O'Connor returned to her analysis five years earlier in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. 26 where she
asserted the equal historical and jurisprudential pedigree of the
no-funding principle. She claimed, the Court's earlier holdings
touting the importance of neutrality "provide no precedent for
2D
21
22
23
24

25
26

Id. at 809.
See id. at 830-32.

See id. at 813-14.
See id. at 801.
See id. at 836.
See id. at 837.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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the use of public funds to finance religious activities." 27
Justice O'Connor's rejection of neutrality as the axiom for
Establishment Clause adjudication is highly significant, for it is
upon a neutrality theory that private choice relies. Justice
O'Connor does not reject the importance of neutrality in aid
cases; neither do Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg. She
would likely uphold a neutral program that contained several
safeguards against funds being used for indoctrination. But the
plurality's unwillingness to temper its view and bring O'Connor
into their fold indicates a fundamental disagreement on the
ordering of Establishment Clause values and on how those
values apply in the real world. Justice Thomas' failure to
address O'Connor's concerns means that her vote in a close
voucher program may turn on which block is more responsive to
those concerns.
In essence, the plurality missed a golden
opportunity to secure O'Connor's vote on vouchers, on an
arguably easier case.
In Mitchell, Justice O'Connor appeared to embrace the
concept of private choice. She used the word "choice" throughout
her discussion. 28 This choice of words suggests that she will
differentiate between programs that offer a true universe of
options and those that merely use a third person to direct the
financial benefit to a religious institution. She would consider
factors that include not only the available applications of the aid,
but also whether the program creates incentives for religious
use; whether the program by policy or practice defines recipients
by reference to religion; and the degree of independence the
recipient has in exercising his or her choice. She stated, "the
choices must be truly independent and meaningful." 29 The
analogy she offered is that of an employee donating a portion of
his government-issued paycheck to a religious institution.3 0
This example was first provided in Witters v. Washington

Id. at 847 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 843 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe distinction between a per-capita aid program and a true private
choice program is important when considering aid that consists of direct monetary
subsidies.").
27

28

29

Id. at 810.

30 See id. at 841 (supporting the proposition that the Establishment Clause is
not violated when funds of the state are conveyed to a religious institution); see also
Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-87 (1986).
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Department of Services for the Blind,3 ' but Witters was arguably
an easier case than one under a voucher program. Larry Witters
was awarded his benefit based on some independent criteria, his
visual disability, which provided him a greater ownership
interest in the aid as well as greater control over its use. The aid
was more like his money, which he could then apply to a true
variety of options. That was the second crucial factor for the
Court, as it relied on the wide variety of applications of the
scholarship at the college level, all of which charged tuition,
recipient
while commenting that it was unlikely that any other
32
would use the scholarships in a religious program.
In contrast, under the Cleveland Voucher Program, the
vouchers are used only in private schools. 33 Public schools do not
participate in the program. 34 Eighty-two percent of the schools
are religious and approximately ninety-six percent of the
students attend religious schools.3 5 The small universe of
options, as designed by the Ohio legislature, means the program
creates incentives for religious use. Justice O'Connor should find
this problematic.
In Mitchell, Justice O'Connor, as she did in Agostini v.
Felton,36 identified several factors beyond the neutrality of a
program that have in the past been crucial for constitutionality
of aid programs. Those factors include whether public funds
reached the "coffers of religious schools,"3 7 whether the aid was
actually diverted for religious uses, and whether the aid
supplanted obligations and expenses the schools would otherwise
have assumed.38 The extent to which she views these additional
factors as effective in a private choice situation is uncertain, but
one could see them becoming more crucial, depending on the
circumstances of a particular case. If, for example, voucher
recipients constituted a high percentage of students attending
31 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
32 See id. at 488.
33 See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 949 (6th Cir. 2000). The circuit

court, citing Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.976(C) (1995), noted that "[plublic schools in
districts adjacent to the district in which the voucher program is implemented may
also register for the program and 'receive scholarship payments on behalf of
parents,' but none of the public schools ...have done so." Id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 521 U.S. 203, 230-33 (2d Cir. 1997).
37 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 843 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38 See id.
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religious schools such that the schools' existence was dependent
on the voucher funds, then Justice O'Connor might elevate the
significance of the supplement-versus-supplant factor.
As a result, neutrality remains an insufficient principle to
support vouchers.
A majority of the Court will require
something more akin to the factors identified by Justice
O'Connor in her Agostini and Mitchell opinions.
In some
instances, choice may be a factor leading to constitutionality of a
program, but other concerns about subsidization and incentives,
as well as, the universe of options will need to be addressed. In
conclusion, equality and neutrality are important constitutional
principles, but they each are inadequate to justify the average
voucher program.

